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The Europeanisation of the Balkans: A Concrete Strategy 
or just a Placebo?  
 
Wim van Meurs 
 
1. The EU’s Past Record in the Balkans 
 
As the recent commemoration of Srebrenica has put in stark contrast, 
over the past decade the EU has evidently come a long way in defining, 
implementing and upholding its strategic vision for the Balkans. 
Handling the independence of Croatia and Slovenia was not the heyday 
of European policy coordination with the naiveté of the Dutch 
government eager to take the credit for solving the post-Yugoslav crisis 
in its presidency and the Franco-German wariness. In the early days of 
Eastern enlargement Paris had insisted on multilateral regionalism as a 
model for stabilisation, whereas Bonn favoured bilateral conditionality. 
Conversely, in the Balkans France banked on individual solutions, 
whereas Germany opted for regional holistic strategies. Additionally, 
European coherence was hampered by the standoff between those 
rejecting post-Yugoslav federal constructions and those offering national 
self-determination. Between 1995 and 1999 Europe has mastered a steep 
learning curve – from the ethnocentric and dysfunctional Dayton model 
to the more realistic and workable Ohrid model, from the adhockery of 
the Bosnian conflict to the concerted conflict-management in Kosovo 
and Macedonia five years later.63 
 
In 1999, in the immediate aftermath of the Kosovo War, the 
International Community laid out its strategic principles and objectives 
for the Western Balkans region, five in total (not necessarily in this 
order): 
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• regionalism, multilateral relations and the instigation of regional 
cooperation; 
• conditionality as the bilateral basis for status vis-à-vis the EU and 
access to preferential treatment; 
• separation of the agendas of integration, transformation and 
stabilisation; 
• the European perspective; and 
• standards before status. 
 
The European principle of regionalism was enshrined in the June 1999 
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. After drawing some heavy fire 
in 2001-2002, the Stability Pact has now scaled down its ambitions, 
prioritised its objectives and found its niche in the international 
framework for Kosovo and the Balkans. The principle of regionalism, 
however, by and large lost out to conditionality.64  
 
As the core principle of EU integration, conditionality came with the 
Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), initiated in parallel with the 
Stability Pact in 1999, but fleshed out in 2000-2001 only. EU 
conditionality for the Balkans added several more to the well-known 
Copenhagen Criteria of Eastern enlargement. For Kosovo, it was Special 
Representative of the Secretary General Steiner’s “standards before 
status” that wrote conditionality in the book in 2002. Since then, it has 
become apparent that conditionality tends to conflict with regionalism as 
it produces widening gaps within the projected region by concentrating 
assistance and privileged relations on those that do well in economic 
transition and in fulfilling EU integration criteria, at the expense of the 
laggards.65 
 
At the same time, the nexus between conditionality and the stages of EU 
integration deprives Brussels of much strategic leverage for key 
objectives of inclusive state consolidation and regional stabilisation in a 
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region of unfinished statehood. The current state of affairs in the region 
indicates that socio-economic transformation makes limited inroads as 
long as issues of state sovereignty and inter-ethnic power games 
dominate the regional and national agendas. With capacities still in the 
making and the institutional separation of the agenda of transformation 
integration from the agenda of stabilisation still largely in place, 
conditionality often appears powerless with the risk of strategic 
initiatives running aground. 
 
In his October 2005 report, Kai Eide thrashed the “standards before 
status” approach in principle,66 blaming it to a significant degree for the 
general malaise in Kosovo and, paradoxically, for the Kosovars’ failure 
to meet the benchmarks too. The “standards before status” approach for 
Kosovo was the mirror image of the EU’s conditionality-based strategy 
for the integration of the entire region into Europe. Thus, the pivotal 
principle of “conditionality” also known as “standards before status” in 
international and most of all European strategies toward the Balkans is 
now coming under question. The consequences for the much-cited “EU 
perspective” are uncertain. 
 
2. 2005 – a successful year, 2006 – a year of decisions? 
 
At the same time, the EU itself has plunged into a deep existential crisis. 
Apart from collective soul-searching, the crisis seemed to produce a 
state of near-paralysis in the Brussels policy-making institutions. Yet, 
the effects of the crisis on the panacea of the “EU perspective” for the 
Balkans seem hardly dramatic and in some respects even 
counterintuitive.  
 
Once the depth of the EU constitutional crisis became apparent with the 
French and Dutch referendums, Brussels went out of its way to reassure 
the Southeast European countries that these issues of the deepening of 
European integration would in no way endanger their European 
perspective. Undeniably, however, paying more attention to national 
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constituencies in the EU made politicians in the capitals as well as the 
EU institutions reluctant to push the vastly unpopular agenda of 
Southeastern enlargement. Conditionality became more pronounced in 
the statements from Brussels; the strategy of the three C’s – 
conditionality (as such), consolidation (of conditionality) and 
communication (of conditionality). In view of the real, but slow and 
uneven progress in the Balkans, the three C’s seemed to confirm the 
regional leaders’ worst fears by offering Europe a ruse to push back the 
issue of integrating the Balkans without having to revoke promises 
made. 
 
For Croatia, the EU at first seemed to apply its standards with utmost 
strictness by making the actual opening of accession negotiation 
dependent on handing over General Ante Gotovina, indicted by the 
Hague Tribunal. The volte-face in October 2005 was the very opposite 
of strict, but fair criteria – a package deal involving Croatia and Turkey. 
Similarly, only an extremely naïve observer might not have seen the 
connection between the upcoming Kosovo negotiations and the sudden 
progress towards a Stabilisation and Association Agreement for Serbia 
and Montenegro. Unperturbed by the tension between a functioning 
democratic process and the dominant role of the High Representative, on 
21 October 2005, the European Commission recommended the opening 
of negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with 
Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Council. On 9 November, the Commission 
unexpectedly recommended to grant Macedonia candidate status. The 
recommendation is based, however, on a report that assesses this state as 
unable to organise free elections, not fully in control of its own territory, 
with a weak and politicised judiciary, not attracting foreign investors and 
falling far behind the rest of the region in terms of economic growth. 
Eventually, in January 2006 SAA negotiations with the last laggard, 
Albania, were concluded.67  
 
The first reaction to the EU crisis seemed to be that Brussels would take 
conditionality and standards very seriously in order to be able to deal 
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with its own crisis of deepening before facing the challenge of enlarging 
to the Southeast. The term “enlargement fatigue” became the ubiquitous 
answer to all questions. Next, these very conditions were bypassed or 
sidelined and each country in the region was upgraded to the respective 
higher level of relations with the EU: “higher status with some 
standards”. In the Kosovo case, “standards before status” has not been 
modified to “standards with status,” but they have de facto been 
decoupled. The countries of the region have been granted a higher status, 
a strategic move largely decoupled from the real, but uneven progress in 
the region. Thus, the verdict on the EU perspective’s real impact on the 
stabilisation and transformation of the region has been adjourned. The 
presumption of innocence for both Brussels and the Western Balkans, 
however, may be a missed opportunity to set the record straight. 
 
Thus, in less than half a year after the crisis, the EU has implicitly 
forsaken some of its sacred principles in order to come to terms with the 
reality check of the Balkans and international constraints. Since mid-
2005 the status of each Western Balkans’ status vis-à-vis the EU, if not 
EU policy towards the respective country, appeared to have made a U-
turn from strict conditionality to “status with or without standards”. At 
closer scrutiny, “moving the region forward” has become the measure of 
success in and by itself: Rather than providing conditionality for the 
stability and statehood-relevant issues, the EU has largely chosen an 
indirect approach by waiving conditionality on the EU integration 
agenda and hoping for an implicit quid pro quo on the stabilisation 
agenda – without, however, establishing an explicit strategic link 
between these parallel agendas under the European perspective.  
 
3. European Perspective? 
 
Thus far the doubts on conditionality and the gloom over the EU 
perspective seem to have had little positive or negative consequences for 
relations between Europe and the Balkans. As a matter of fact, on closer 
scrutiny, explanations on how the EU perspective works or should work 
vary considerably. Four views may be discerned. Firstly, standard 
political rhetoric on the Balkans puts its trust in the assumption that the 
EU perspective per se offers such an attractive option to the peoples of 
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the region that no politician can afford to ignore this popular consensus 
for long. Despite the inevitable setbacks and political ill-will, it is 
argued, the long-term stabilising and transformative effects of the EU 
perspective are a self-fulfilling prophecy in the political process of what 
used to be Europe’s last hotspot. The EU perspective thus more or less 
produces its positive effects almost irrespective of the actual aid 
programs, policy instruments and technical assistance linked to it. 
 
Others have argued that Eastern enlargement has proven that even a 
more short-term perspective cannot do without the financial resources, 
norms, expertise and guidance of the EU to bring the transformation 
countries closer to EU standards. Optimistically, this second view 
assumes that the transformation process in South-eastern Europe will 
just take longer and be more arduous than its role model and predecessor 
in East-Central Europe. Conversely, it might be argued that at least in 
some respects the Balkans is not the next enlargement, but Europe’s first 
encounter with countries that are not relatively close to EU standards, 
still in the middle of the transformation process and without a tangible 
membership perspective to drive the process and uphold the popular 
consensus, i.e. more like the countries in the European neighbourhood.68 
The concrete architecture and logic of EU policies and resources for the 
Balkans has often been criticized as being too technical and focussed on 
good governance and administrative capacity building.69 Another point 
of critique concerns the strict nexus between formal status vis-à-vis the 
EU and access to certain programs and instruments.70 Croatia, for 
instance, bitterly complained that Romania and Bulgaria had access to 
certain EU benefits forfeited to Croatia because it did not have candidate 
status. Logically, conditionality rewards the most successful 
transformers in the heterogeneous region and widens the gap to the 
laggards. 
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A third, less ambitious, but equally optimistic view claims that the true 
power of the EU is neither in the perspective per se nor in the concrete 
instruments, but in the so called “member state building”. The intricate 
process of EU integration with all its norms, procedures and criteria is 
the best crash-course in rational state management, good governance and 
administrative capacity building ever. The added value is in the form 
rather than the content of the EU integration process.71 
 
Fourthly, the most relevant sceptics in the current context are those who 
insist that the EU should make good use of its integration perspective in 
a much more strategic manner, by linking the benefits and incentives of 
accession explicitly to the core objectives of stability and statehood. It is 
argued that the full catalogue of EU benchmarks, criteria and acquis is 
more than a bridge too far for a region still hampered by unresolved 
questions of state and nation building, be it Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, 
Montenegro or the future status of Kosovo. It is argued that the 
heterogeneity of status vis-à-vis the EU for each and every country in the 
region defies all declarations on regionalism.72 At the same time, the 
strict separation of the agendas of stabilisation and integration allows 
local politicians to obstruct the process of regional stabilisation despite 
all EU urgings, while urging Brussels not to obstruct the next step 
towards EU membership. 
 
4. Strategic Europe? Status with or without standards 
 
As noted, “standards before status” is the localisation of EU 
conditionality for the particular case of Kosovo. As the contrasts 
between the various EU agendas are nowhere more apparent than in the 
last remaining powder keg of the Balkans, the dilemma of conditionality 
and the strategic deficits of Europe stand out with particular clarity here. 
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In May 2005, the U.S. State Department’s Nicholas Burns strongly 
suggested that negotiations would start almost irrespective of the 
outcome of the standards review and in no veiled terms offered 
advantages in Euro-Atlantic integration to both parties to the conflict as 
a reward for a constructive attitude at the negotiation table. With real 
negotiations approaching, however, uncompromising rhetoric is back to 
conceal what is actually a lack of preparedness for a major political deal. 
Typically, the nexus between status and stabilisation, on the one hand, 
and the perspective of EU integration, on the other hand, was made by 
an American. 
 
Defining Kosovo’s future status requires a strategic deal and political 
arm-twisting. The comprehensive catalogue of standards, reaching far 
beyond the actual issues of unfinished statehood and minority protection 
is inappropriate as a litmus test for opening the door to independence. 
On the one hand, the standards before status fails to provide (negative 
and positive) incentives for the Serb minority and, on the other hand, the 
standards catalogue makes it too easy for Kosovar politicians to go for a 
D grade – “poor, but passing”; progress in some areas and serious 
deficits in other. Thus, the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General 
Kai Eide gave a mixed judgement on the standards in his October 2005 
report (tougher and more forthright than many observers had 
expected).73 The Eide report is indeed not so much an assessment of the 
state of affairs and Kosovo’s fulfilment of the UN standards, but rather a 
political post-status recommendation. His suggestions included a High 
Representative-type international guarantor and monitor mission for 
interethnic relations, minority protection as well as special rights for the 
Serbs concerning cultural and religious sites. It is worth noting, 
moreover, that the report referred to the “future” and not to the “final” 
status of Kosovo. Evidently, the envisaged outcome is an incremental 
process rather than a fixed finalité. The EU integration perspective is 
expected to serve as the driver, the objective and guiding principle of the 
status process.  
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The one option with a potential for a viable future for Albanians and 
Serbs in Kosovo within a stable Western Balkans is qualified 
independence. Kosovo’s independence should be qualified by 
international (probably EU) monitoring of minority protection and 
policies with substantial, but functional autonomy for the Serb 
communities in an inclusive state of Kosovo, but without sharing 
(territorial) sovereign rights over Kosovo between Prishtina and 
Belgrade.74 Can the EU shoulder such a multiple task – Kosovo and for 
the region as a whole? Brussels has expressed its readiness to shoulder 
more tasks in Kosovo and the Balkans in general, ranging from police 
missions to a post-status EU-MIK. 
 
5. Challenges Ahead 
 
The EU seems ready to take the lead in managing both the post-status 
future for Kosovo and the stabilisation and transformation process for 
the region as a whole. Yet, the past few months have seen unexpected, 
but contradictory changes in the EU’s strategic approach. The assumed 
pull of the EU perspective is increasingly questioned, if only because of 
the EU’s internal crisis, and a decoupling of standards and status seems 
to have taken place not only for Kosovo, but also for the region as a 
whole. Upgrading the status of each Balkan country recently therefore 
was the right move for the wrong reasons. The strategic questions have 
been pushed away, but not resolved. 
 
In sum, the European Union will be challenged in the near future not 
only to hold out the EU perspective as an positive alternative to the 
vicious circle of ethnic strife and flawed transition, but also to set up and 
manage the actual process combining stabilisation, transition and 
integration in a effective and consistent manner. At the same time, with 
the opening of status negotiations the strategy of standards before status 
for Kosovo has been sidelined. The parallel upgrading of most countries 
of the region based on the urge to demonstrate success in combination 
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with the EU perspective has similarly cast doubt on the authority of the 
EU’s key strategy for the region (and beyond). 
 
In sum, Kosovo has successfully argued that it can only fulfil Steiner’s 
catalogue of standards once it has independent status. Bosnia has 
persuaded the EU to give it SAA status although serious deficits on basic 
criteria remain. Once it had been given SAA status, Croatia convinced 
Brussels that its progress towards EU standards actually required the 
instruments and incentives of candidate status to produce further results. 
The conflict between the vicious circle of “no standards without status” 
and the virtuous circle of “status after standards” cannot be resolved as 
long as the stabilisation of the region and its entities or states is not 
pushed with a targeted and relevant menu of conditions and incentives. 
By and large, the EU package of conditions and assistance remains 
monolithic and determined by a country’s status vis-à-vis the EU rather 
than by its actual needs and capacities. Consequently, some useful and 
effective instruments for fulfilling EU criteria are withheld from aspiring 
countries because they do not have the right status. Especially the 
traditional misfit of, on the one hand, the structural and procedural 
agendas of transformation and integration represented by the 
Commission and the SAP and, on the other hand, the agenda of 
stabilisation and crisis management represented by Solana and the 
Council has substantially reduced the leverage of Europe and the 
consistency of EU leadership in the region. With the prospect of Bosnia 
and Kosovo (and to a lesser extent Macedonia) becoming some kind of 
EU neo-trusteeships for the medium-term, the sequencing and 
management of conditionality and status and of the stabilisation and 
integration agendas should be taken very seriously; turning the EU into a 
proactive strategic player without forsaking the inherent power of the 
EU perspective.  
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